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Showing posts with label March 8. Show all posts
Showing posts with label March 8. Show all posts

Wednesday, May 21, 2008

Deal Reached in Doha: Great Step or a Step Backwards?

It seems to be true. Our feuding leaders have reached an agreement under Qatari and Arab supervision/arm bending/baby sitting.

The Good
Some (for example Michel Murr in his LBC interview) see this as a great victory for Lebanon and the Lebanese and a step towards prosperity, and they may have a point or two. The interviews with politicians from Doha seem nothing like the rhetoric of just a few days ago, and one may hope that the politicians are serious about keeping the discourse peaceful and civilized. As much as I would like to believe in this rosy picture, I tend not to.

The Bad
For one, nothing could hide the fact that this is just another piece of strong evidence that our consensual sectarian democracy is a disaster. In fact, even if (especially if?) we disregard the shameful coup, raids and counter raids that plagued the prelude to Doha, we have to realize that it took the Arab league, the Qatari Emir, all his relationships with regional and international powers, and no small amount of cajoling and hard diplomacy to forge a deal that can only be objectively viewed as a defeat to Democracy first and perhaps to March 14 - but only as a distant second.

That our country needs foreign mediators to resolve a national crisis is a testament to the failure of the current Lebanese political and social culture. That even then, no serious issues were solved in Doha, but only a power sharing agreement was reached is a testament to the lack of a will for progress and a consecration of the patronage mentality that has plagued us for centuries. That most of the terms of the agreement are easily in favor of the opposition is a testament to the usefulness of possessing arms and using them to forge a political agreement that is favorable. Hizbulla did it at the cost of a sectarian schism that may take years to heal. That our leadership manages to polarize our public on a sectarian basis by using violence is a testament to our ever-continuing lack of a national identity. That our army's cheerleading a coup is lauded as wise behaviour that preserved its unity is a testament to the malaise that plagues our social fabric.


The Ugly Truth
The truth is that regardless of winners, losers and political analysis of the deal, the bottom line is that between the inaction of the army prior to Doha, the subsequent capitulation of the goverment to Hizbulla's demands, and then the agreement in Doha on the election of Michel Sleiman, the adoption of the (modified) 1960 electoral law for one time only of course, the absence (as of yet) of a clear statement about the weapons of Hizbulla, and the forging of a power sharing agreement between Lebanese political factions outside of Lebanese political institutions, one thing remains truer than ever.

Our constitution, the Taif accord, our parliament, our government institutions, our police, and our army, are worth nothing. Indeed both our archaic societal structure and our political culture need to be reformulated on sound principles if we want to avoid repeating our shameful history - as we usually do - in the near future. But in the meantime, preytell, now that they are reinforced, what do we do about Hizbulla, their weapons, their ideology and their methods?

Sunday, December 23, 2007

Reassessment ?

Preamble
I have had a hard time posting anything of value lately, mostly because the situation in Lebanon is so downright repulsive that I could not bring myself to sit down and write anything useful that the Lebanese blogosphere has not already successfully and repetitively tackled...

Perhaps at the risk of breaking that trend, in this post I intend to briefly examine the current impasse in Lebanon from the context of the power struggle between the various political factions in Lebanon, the regional players, and the international ones, as well as the interplay among them.

For anyone who reads this post, I ask that you be patient with me as I try to dissect the situation and that you keep in mind that I am doing this as much for my understanding of the Lebanese impasse as for anything else.

Zoom Out
It may be quite useful to take the current delays in voting in a new president as simply another skirmish in the battle for Lebanon. Clearly the battle for Lebanon, from an international perspective, is to be taken in the context of the diplomatic war being waged between Syria and Iran on one hand and the West on the other. Nothing has changed from that perspective. Except that the momentum seems to have shifted, for various reasons.

Rewind
In particular, in the immediate aftermath of the Hariri assassination and the ensuing intense international and local Lebanese pressure the momentum was clearly in favor of the March 14 movement and its international sponsors thereby forcing the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon. Furthermore, the Mehlis era of the international investigation put extreme pressure on the Syrians and on their March 8 allies placing them in a distinctively defensive position. March 14 managed to consolidate some gains with a government composed mainly of their people but failed miserably to push the envelope any further by ousting Lahoud.

Since then, blunder after blunder on the March 14 side and a cooling of the pressure put by the international investigation under Brammertz led to the momentum slowly shifting to the March 8 side. Moreover, the aftermath of the July war between Hezbollah and Israel has proved to be a particularly miserable time for the March 14'ers with the offensive shifting to the opposition which even tried (and failed) to topple the government.

Fast Forward
After the continuing ebb and flow between government and opposition, and more generally between March 14 and March 8, and more globally between the West and the Syro/Iranian axis, there seems to be a certain equilibrium that has been reached, a certain balance of power. The trenches are dug and the opposing sides are unable to gain much ground.

Zoom In
While the internal balance of power is understandable given everything that has happened and the possible incompetence of March 14 in managing the crisis to their favor, one question that remains is whether it would be possible for them to regain the upper hand?

The Big Picture
Well, to answer that question, one must look at the current stalemate and examine the possible ways to break it, but more importantly one must understand that any risk taken could result in defeat rather than victory. Thus it becomes important to assess the possible gains in taking any risky maneuvers, weighing them against the risk factor and making an educated guess as to whether the maneuver is worth it. Finally, it is imperative that the decision reached be based upon a sober analysis of the above factors.

In the Blue Corner
As far as March 8 is concerned, the strategy that they are employing is mainly summarized by: impede, impede, impede. In the background, plan B lurks (whether or not it would be put into action) and the March 14ers know it. More precisely, in case March 14 chooses to try something that March 8 considers bold or threatening, the M14ers have to do it with the implicit threat of civil disorder - or worse - by their opponents and the tightly controlled Hizbollah crowd.

While they impede and hold their opponents in check with the threat of chaos, the M8ers don't really have a victory strategy apart from waiting for the current parliament to either finish its 4 year mandate or for enough M14 MP's to spontaneously combust so that the majority in parliament shifts.

In the Red Corner
On the other hand, the M14 cards have quickly run out, and all they can do is threaten with a 50+1 election of a new president or with a government initiated amendment of the constitution in favor of an army chief who at best is an unknown commodity. The latter option is being impeded, while the former is held in check with the opposition's implicit threat of chaos.

Thus, it is most likely that the internal balance cannot be broken without outside assistance that has to be real, understood, appraised and efficiently utilized.

Weight of the Supporting Cast
Clearly the M8ers have solid political and logistic support from the Syrians and solid political and financial support from the Iranians. However, they are incapable of helping their allies deliver a KO to the March 14ers for fear of international retribution. Thus the M8ers support is real, understood, appraised and insufficient for a KO.

Similarly, March 14 has (semi-?)solid international support and (weak ?) Arab support that keeps the opposition from leveraging its external allies/sponsors' superior financial and logistic support into a clear victory. However, for one reason or another March 14 seems incapable of leveraging its own external support into victory. Namely, their own indecisiveness has proven crippling, and the constant European and occasional American engagement of Syria has possibly instilled doubt into the March 14ers minds and made them refrain further from any bold gestures. Thus, March 14 knows it is supported but does not know for sure how much, or how far its international supporters would back it should chaos erupt, or how useful such support would be. Moreover, even if it does understand all of that, M14 may not be willing to live with the consequences of chaos. All that uncertainty seems to be crippling M14 which seems to be just dancing around the ring waiting for their opponent to slip up. Their time would be better spent waiting for Godot.

Assessment: In Brief
It is thus more and more clear that this is not a time where a clear victory can be expected from (and by) either side. The crisis is being managed and political battles are being fought slowly, with a backdrop of assassinations and possible (real/perceived) instability. It seems that those are the now accepted rules of the game. In any case, now that the president will be either the increasingly unlikely army general or an inconsequential other, the opposition seems resigned to live with the M14 government while trying to haggle for position in the next.

Back to The Future
Moreover, as the clock ticks on the international tribunal, the presidential election, and the ensuing government, the current parliament trudges slowly closer to the end of its term without a viable electoral law in place. As that further deadline looms closer and closer, and as the regional and international players fail to force the other side's hand, the only internal possibility to break the stalemate seems to be either a bold M8 move in the direction of chaos, or a bold M14 move in the direction of electing a 50+1 president that is not Suleiman - or both. Of course, another distinct possibility is a gradual softening of stances from some of the individual components of one side or both sides, maybe even leading to realignment...

Reassessment: In Briefer
The most likely option, based on the above, is more of the same. Meanwhile, the players seem to accept the new rules of the game, and will most likely play by them. It is still a stare down.

Saturday, May 05, 2007

On the Presidency


While it may be true that there we will see some level of perpetuation of the political paralysis in Lebanon even after Lahoud's term is over, it is also true that Lahoud himself has been an exceptional obstruction. Moreover, it is true that with the coming end of his term, Lebanon has to potentially deal with a new crisis stemming from the very divisive issue of electing a new president.

As previously mentioned, Lahoud has been a huge obstructive factor in Lebanese political affairs. He has refused to sign many many bills, refused to accept many foreign ambassadors (while he has also not outright rejected them), impeded the appointment of Lebanese ambassadors to foreign countries and obstructed the hiring and promotion of high level public servants, and so on and so forth...

That could all change with a vacant presidency or a March 14 president.

Moreover, huff and puff and do what they may, March 8 realizes that the government is legit. The constitution is clear and everything else is propaganda^. In fact, what we are seeing on their part is desperate politics. Hizbulla is desperate to protect its Syrian ally/master from the tribunal and to protect itself from the possible evolution (for better or worse) of Lebanon and its transition into a stable (?) post Syrian era. It needs to find a formula that guarantees its ability to operate within a framework as similar as possible to the one it operated in during the Syrian era. They are fighting tooth and claw for that.

Similarly, Aoun is desperate because he is seeing the deadline for the presidency approach and his chances for the post are not increasing.
Both are fighting an uphill battle against the forward motion of time.

But what can they all do? The March 8 alliance knows that within the rules of the game, i.e, the constitution, all they can ever hope to do is impede the election of a president, pending an agreement or compromise that does not seem likely, or that will come at Aoun's expense. As I might have mentioned before, that vacuum in the presidency leaves the president's authority in the cabinet's hands*. That explains one aspect of the need that the March 8 alliance sees for "breaking" the cabinet by denying it legitimacy and trying to force it to resign.

But once again, then what? March 8 until now has no constructive strategy from within the bounds of the constitution and the law.
Not to be restricted by such ridiculous things as laws and constitutions, their alternatives are simple. Early elections, transforming Lebanon's parliamentary system into a presidential one (for one time only of course)...

At this point, I give up...
March 8 must know that their demands are unreasonable and more importantly unacceptable to the "ruling majority". What matters now is that the presidential endgame is approaching. However, try as I might I can't find a logical strategy that March 8 can pursue in the endgame.

Short of spreading chaos.


Footnotes From the Lebanese Constitution:
^
- المادة 95 (المعدلة بالقانون الدستوري الصادر في 9/11/1943 وبالقانون الدستوري الصادر في 21/9/1990) على مجلس النواب المنتخب على أساس المناصفة بين المسلمين والمسيحيين اتخاذ الإجراءات الملائمة لتحقيق إلغاء الطائفية السياسية وفق خطة مرحلية وتشكيل هيئة وطنية برئاسة رئيس الجمهورية، تضم بالإضافة إلى رئيس مجلس النواب ورئيس مجلس الوزراء شخصيات سياسية وفكرية واجتماعية. مهمة الهيئة دراسة واقتراح الطرق الكفيلة بإلغاء الطائفية وتقديمها إلى مجلسي النواب والوزراء ومتابعة تنفيذ الخطة المرحلية.وفي المرحلة الانتقالية: أ- تمثل الطوائف بصورة عادلة في تشكيل الوزارة. ب- تلغى قاعدة التمثيل الطائفي ويعتمد الاختصاص والكفاءة في الوظائف العامة والقضاء والمؤسسات العسكرية والأمنية والمؤسسات العامة والمختلطة وفقاً لمقتضيات الوفاق الوطني باستثناء وظائف الفئة الأولى فيها وفي ما يعادل الفئة الأولى فيها وتكون هذه الوظائف مناصفة بين المسيحيين والمسلمين دون تخصيص أية وظيفة لأية طائفة مع التقيد بمبدأي الاختصاص والكفاءة.


*
- المادة 62 (المعدلة بالقانون الدستوري الصادر في 21/9/1990)
في حال خلو سدة الرئاسة لأي علة كانت تناط صلاحيات رئيس الجمهورية وكالة بمجلس الوزراء.


In English:

^
Article 95 [National Committee](1) The first Chamber or Deputies which is elected on the basis of equality between Muslims and Christians takes the appropriate measures to realize the abolition of political confessionalism according to a transitional plan. A National Committee is to be formed, headed by the President of the Republic, including, in addition to the President of the Chamber of Deputies and the Prime Minister, leading political, intellectual, and social figures.(2) The tasks of this Committee are to study and propose the means to ensure the abolition of confessionalism, propose them to the Chamber of Deputies and the Ministers, and supervise the execution of the transitional plan.(3) During the transitional phase:
a. The confessional groups are to be represented in a just and equitable fashion in the formation of the Cabinet.
b. The principle of confessional representation in public servicejobs, in the judiciary, in the military and security institutions, and in public and mixed agencies are to be cancelled in accordance with the requirements of national reconciliation; they shall be replaced by the principle of expertise and competence. However, Grade One posts and their equivalents are exempt from this rule, and the posts must be distributed equally between Christians and Muslims without reserving any particular job for any confessional group but rather applying the principles of expertise and competence


*
Article 62 [Vacancy]Should the Presidency become vacant for any reason whatsoever, the Council of Ministers exercises the powers of the President by delegation.

Thursday, April 19, 2007

Possible Effects of Hizbulla's Maneuverings on the Sunni-Shia divide in Lebanon

Sound analysis of the Lebanese crisis over the course of the past couple of years -in the aftermath of Hariri's assassination and especially after the war last July -necessarily leads to the conclusion that the schism between the two sides of the Lebanese political spectrum can only widen. More dangerously, the effects of that schism can take on an increasingly sectarian image pitting Sunni against Shia.

A quick glance at what the future holds in store in the Lebanese political and legal arena shows two main events looming on the horizon - the presidential elections and the establishment of the international tribunal. In both cases Hizbulla and its allies, Nabih Berri and Michel Aoun are swimming upstream. There is not much they can do to stop the tribunal and even less to elect a president of their choice, both apparently objectives of the aptly named opposotion. To be precise, the only game they can play is one of hampering, obstruction and general bullying, which is exactly what they have been doing and will continue to do. The reason behind Hizbulla choosing to fight a losing battle is simple: the stakes are simply too high and eventhough the deck is stacked against them, Hizbulla have no choice (short of changing their very identity, ideology and MO) but to continue in their desperate tactics aimed at preventing the game from changing. But they have already lost that battle.

Naturally, with the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, there was no turning back the clock. But Hizbulla and its allies have not come to terms with that yet. In fact, they have tried various tactics to fill the vacuum that the Syrian overlords had left in their wake, the most obvious of which were bullying - political terror, so to speak - and instigating a war.

Recently, one can argue that more signs of hardening have started to emerge in their rhetoric and politics, whether by refusing to comment on the tribunal or by refusing the Arab proposed peace deal - even as Bashar is desperately trying to get Israel to engage him.

In any case, time moves forward and the direct Syrian era is fading into the background, but Hizbulla is becoming evermore associated in the eyes of many Lebanese with the opressors of a bygone era. With its goals of protecting Syria and imposing the will of the few, Hizbulla is playing a dangerous game. The Syrians were a foreign opressor, regardless of how "brotherly" our relationship with them should be. But Hizbulla is Lebanese, regardless of the foreign masters it serves. Its popular base is distinctly Lebanese, Shia to be specific. And as the stances of Hizbulla - from the rejection of a tribunal designed to investigate and try suspects in the brutal killing of a Sunni leader, to the rejection of a (Sunni) Arab launched peace initiative, to numerous other acts - start looking more and more like overtly sectarian behaviour shamelessly protecting murderous regimes at the expense of the interests of other communities in Lebanon (and of Lebanon as a state) - Hizbulla is putting its willing Shia base in an increasingly precarious situation, as the Sunni leadership in March 14 is becoming more and more comfortable with its Sunni identity, that can be a dangerous game to play...

Sunday, April 01, 2007

Now what ?

It is getting beyond ridiculous... If Lebanese bloggers the world could see all of the crap going on in Lebanon coming from as far back 2 years ago, and advocated a "seize the day" approach - lest we get to where we are now - why couldn't March 14's leadership.
Alas, historical opportunities were missed not once, or twice but at least three times over... Its nothing short of amazing. Gambling on the wrong horse once or twice could be a mixture of stupidity and lack of luck, but gambling on the losing horse every single time requires a certain kind of incompetence only Lebanese leaders possess. Lucky us...
So, in short, events now are just consequences of M14's failure to act, a consequence of the deal they struck with HA and Amal during elections, of the patriarch's inability to see beyond the position of the presidency (whatever the hell that means) and of Saad's political inexperience and servitude to Saudi, of their constant courting of Nabih Berri and failure to see him for what he really is. What we are seeing now is nothing short of the natural progression of events. You see, March 14 gave up the ball, lost the initiative, and allowed Syria and Iran's counter-revolutionaries to regroup, re-organize, steal the initiative and force at least a stalemate.
March 14 cannot give the opposition a third plus one of the positions in government, for that is "political suicide". Right. But why would March 8 accept anything less ? They have managed to stall government, which is useless without parliament - incidentally also stalled, not to mention the presidency which has been a lost cause for a while now.
Where can March 14 go from here? That is the main question. HOw can they regain the initiative? Many of us had an answer two years ago - it was called march to Baabda, resuggested a year ago, even possibly viable a few months ago, but I doubt that any feasible answer exists today. Until something changes - drastically - or until March 14 forces a change... But that goes counter to their very fabric.

Wednesday, February 21, 2007

Brace yourselves... Its gonna be a long long long ride

I have been relatively quiet throughout the events unfolding in Lebanon and the region in early 2007... mostly because there is nothing much to say in the way of analysis.

While there have been many developments, from Hezbollah's riots on a certain Tuesday that now seems so long ago, to the blow-back across universities two days later... all the way to the Ayn Aar bus bombings -shocking the country and yet shocking no one- and then the large, yet inane regurgitation plagued gathering on the anniversary of Hariri's assassination.

In the meantime, rumors of breakthroughs in "indirect" talks conducted through Iran and Saudi Arabia (woopdidoo) were circulating and proving to be vacuous. No compromises have yet materialized and I doubt any to materialize in the near future... I don't even know if I want to be wrong or not anymore - what difference does it make?

After all this is no longer primarily about Lebanon or its internal politics, March 8 succeeded at internationalizing Lebanese politics, and consequently our problems are becoming even less about Lebanon by the day. Amidst Saudi-Iranian talks and the Syro-Iranian coordination, as well as all that recent Iranian belligerency and their never-ending war games and display of divine weapons (probably imported from either russia or china and upgraded in Iran) countered by the leakage (or announcement, I forget) of American (contingency) plans to bomb the living crap out of all Iran's nuclear and military facilities... amidst all that, Lebanon's factions are becoming just cards to be played out in a much bigger regional game.

Bottom line, as Syria and Iran play for time waiting for a Godot that even they might not recognize, Lebanon simmers and starts showing signs of boiling. In the meantime the economy is tanking, state instutions are shackled and we are left at the mercy of... well I am not sure whose mercy we are at.

I am just asking myself what should we expect the near future to bring, knowing and fearing that its going to be more of the same - at best.

Friday, January 12, 2007

Give Them Enough Rope and They Will Hang Themselves

An Analysis of The March 14 Coalition Strategy Against the Hizbulla Led Opposition

It has been over a month since the Hizbulla led, Syro-Iranian backed opposition launched its campaign to topple the March 14 government which ironically they were part of. The campaign started with all the "opposition" ministers resigning and escalated with demonstrations in December and sit-ins in downtown Beirut demanding the resignation of Siniora's government. The opposition apparently tried to up the ante recently with the "Labor Union" staging demonstrations in front of various ministries objecting agains the government's reform plans and covertly the Paris III donor conference. Moreover, the speaker of parliament, Nabih Berri has refused to convene parliament effectively crippling the March 14 parliamentary majority...

In the face of pressure, the March 14 coalition simply held their ground. They staged counter demonstrations in many different Lebanese locales aimed at showing the popular support that the coalition enjoyed, called for the resigned ministers to rejoin the government and petitioned continuously for parliament to convene. The strategy seems to be simply to give the opposition enough rope to hang themselves. In other words, the government is simply letting the opposition make mistakes and escalate and burn bridges all the while somehow weakening them. What I continue to believe are half-measures and lack of initiative on March 14's side, seem to be "working" anyway. It appears that the opposition is running out of steam and/or struggling with internal squabbling resulting from the different intensity of political escalation which its various components (namely Hizbulla and Aoun's FPM) can withstand to achieve their various objectives and not lose popular support. The opposition continuously burned bridges over the past month and has not really offered anything in the way of an agenda except for toppling the government. As that goal seems further out of reach, I believe that they are now rethinking their strategy, counting to ten before taking further action.

Thus, the March 14ers seem to have the opposition caught in a deadlock or a stalemate which can only be broken through dialogue (either internally or with/amongst the foreign supporters of both camps). Assuming that the government manages to get the opposition to call off its campaign against Siniora, and to re-accept dialogue, it would achieve an important moral victory but nothing more.

The main issues that March 14 and March 8 disagree upon will not have been solved, the March 14ers will not have regained initiative and the March 8ers will still be able to play the impeding role that they have played since the inception of this government, serving Hizbulla's internal agendas as well as those of Iran and Syria. Upon closer inspection, I don't see that the eventual resolution of this particular conflict in favor of March 14 as useful in the resolution of the bigger conflict defined by establishing a certain high degree of Lebanese decision making capability, independent of (and sometimes against) Syrian and Iranian interest. One can even argue that March 14 is inherently incapable of such a challenge, but I won't get into that now.

Meanwhile, the political battle rages on, even though March 8 may have fumbled the ball on this one.