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Showing posts with label Opinion. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Opinion. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 15, 2008

Damascus, Arab Cultural Capital for 2008: A fitting title

Damascus welcomes 2008 as the cultural capital of the Arab world.

While this may be amazing - considering the Syrian regime's track record, I find that it is a fitting title in an Arab world where the pervasive ruling culture is that of oppression of the masses, repression of dissent, stifling of freedoms, incarceration of liberals, persecution of intellectuals and brutal crack downs on opposition, not to mention political assassinations.

If the "culture" that permeates the Arab ruling classes is to be celebrated, then what better capital than Damascus.

Friday, November 30, 2007

Presidential Musings

Aside from the rightful and righteous indignation that many bloggers are displaying around the nomination of Michel Sleiman as a consensus candidate, both the timing of the move and its nature sparked some questions and observations that I found interesting.

1- Purely out of interest, I am just wondering what rabbit out of the hat are our beloved MPs going to pull to amend the constitution, when constitutionally they cannot amend the constitution this time - one time only or otherwise. In other words, not only is it deplorable that they are considering the same trick that our overbearing neighborly previous occupier (you know which one I am talking about) used to pull, but it is also explicitly illegal this time.

2- How on Earth can there be no audible cries of indignation from within M14 (say from the nominees whose candidacy is being scuttled) or especially from within the M14 crowd - say from the 1% that actually demonstrated a long long time ago in a galaxy far far away, for something rather than somesect or someone. Oh right, those 1% where guided by principles personified in assassinated journalists, and arguably even led by said assassinated journalists...

3- How about that timing? I mean Sleiman's candidacy was up for discussion when it was still possible to legally disregard the constitution and amend it for one time only, for the 4th time in a row. Why was it inconceivable back then and why is it ok now. What changed ?

4- Which brings us to Annapolis. The big unknown as far as I am concerned. There are fears that some sort of deal was struck between the US and Syria with the Saudis having some hand in it. Who the hell knows.

5- Of course, there is also the distinct possibility that M14 (read the big 3 in M14) having gotten rid of Lahoud (as in by virtue of the passage of time) without him reverting to trigerring the formation of a second government, felt that it had won a minor (major ?) victory and hence felt that it was capable of compromising a little bit with the opposition. You know, with the president having no powers save from stalling the passage of time - who in M14 really cares ?

6- But then again, why Michel Sleiman? I mean fine, he is widely respected bla bla, but he is also not constitutionally allowed to run, and parliament is not allowed to mess with the constitution at this time - not that, this would stop Lebanese parliamentarians, the eternal guardians of the republic, the constitution and the rule of law. But I digress. So if you are M14, why pick a maneuvre that is so morally and legally weak, on the grounds of averting a civil war. Especially when I am sure that out of at least tens of thousands of eligible (and apparently willing) Maronites, there must be one other candidate who can avert the threat of civil war, i.e. be non-threatening to Hizbulla and Syria...


It all just doesn't make sense to me, and my feeling is that this won't go through. Of course I am basing my argument on the premise that nothing substantial has changed. Otherwise, in such a short time, much has changed on the international, regional and possibly national levels that we don't know about and that our politicians feel that they do.

Saturday, May 05, 2007

On the Presidency


While it may be true that there we will see some level of perpetuation of the political paralysis in Lebanon even after Lahoud's term is over, it is also true that Lahoud himself has been an exceptional obstruction. Moreover, it is true that with the coming end of his term, Lebanon has to potentially deal with a new crisis stemming from the very divisive issue of electing a new president.

As previously mentioned, Lahoud has been a huge obstructive factor in Lebanese political affairs. He has refused to sign many many bills, refused to accept many foreign ambassadors (while he has also not outright rejected them), impeded the appointment of Lebanese ambassadors to foreign countries and obstructed the hiring and promotion of high level public servants, and so on and so forth...

That could all change with a vacant presidency or a March 14 president.

Moreover, huff and puff and do what they may, March 8 realizes that the government is legit. The constitution is clear and everything else is propaganda^. In fact, what we are seeing on their part is desperate politics. Hizbulla is desperate to protect its Syrian ally/master from the tribunal and to protect itself from the possible evolution (for better or worse) of Lebanon and its transition into a stable (?) post Syrian era. It needs to find a formula that guarantees its ability to operate within a framework as similar as possible to the one it operated in during the Syrian era. They are fighting tooth and claw for that.

Similarly, Aoun is desperate because he is seeing the deadline for the presidency approach and his chances for the post are not increasing.
Both are fighting an uphill battle against the forward motion of time.

But what can they all do? The March 8 alliance knows that within the rules of the game, i.e, the constitution, all they can ever hope to do is impede the election of a president, pending an agreement or compromise that does not seem likely, or that will come at Aoun's expense. As I might have mentioned before, that vacuum in the presidency leaves the president's authority in the cabinet's hands*. That explains one aspect of the need that the March 8 alliance sees for "breaking" the cabinet by denying it legitimacy and trying to force it to resign.

But once again, then what? March 8 until now has no constructive strategy from within the bounds of the constitution and the law.
Not to be restricted by such ridiculous things as laws and constitutions, their alternatives are simple. Early elections, transforming Lebanon's parliamentary system into a presidential one (for one time only of course)...

At this point, I give up...
March 8 must know that their demands are unreasonable and more importantly unacceptable to the "ruling majority". What matters now is that the presidential endgame is approaching. However, try as I might I can't find a logical strategy that March 8 can pursue in the endgame.

Short of spreading chaos.


Footnotes From the Lebanese Constitution:
^
- المادة 95 (المعدلة بالقانون الدستوري الصادر في 9/11/1943 وبالقانون الدستوري الصادر في 21/9/1990) على مجلس النواب المنتخب على أساس المناصفة بين المسلمين والمسيحيين اتخاذ الإجراءات الملائمة لتحقيق إلغاء الطائفية السياسية وفق خطة مرحلية وتشكيل هيئة وطنية برئاسة رئيس الجمهورية، تضم بالإضافة إلى رئيس مجلس النواب ورئيس مجلس الوزراء شخصيات سياسية وفكرية واجتماعية. مهمة الهيئة دراسة واقتراح الطرق الكفيلة بإلغاء الطائفية وتقديمها إلى مجلسي النواب والوزراء ومتابعة تنفيذ الخطة المرحلية.وفي المرحلة الانتقالية: أ- تمثل الطوائف بصورة عادلة في تشكيل الوزارة. ب- تلغى قاعدة التمثيل الطائفي ويعتمد الاختصاص والكفاءة في الوظائف العامة والقضاء والمؤسسات العسكرية والأمنية والمؤسسات العامة والمختلطة وفقاً لمقتضيات الوفاق الوطني باستثناء وظائف الفئة الأولى فيها وفي ما يعادل الفئة الأولى فيها وتكون هذه الوظائف مناصفة بين المسيحيين والمسلمين دون تخصيص أية وظيفة لأية طائفة مع التقيد بمبدأي الاختصاص والكفاءة.


*
- المادة 62 (المعدلة بالقانون الدستوري الصادر في 21/9/1990)
في حال خلو سدة الرئاسة لأي علة كانت تناط صلاحيات رئيس الجمهورية وكالة بمجلس الوزراء.


In English:

^
Article 95 [National Committee](1) The first Chamber or Deputies which is elected on the basis of equality between Muslims and Christians takes the appropriate measures to realize the abolition of political confessionalism according to a transitional plan. A National Committee is to be formed, headed by the President of the Republic, including, in addition to the President of the Chamber of Deputies and the Prime Minister, leading political, intellectual, and social figures.(2) The tasks of this Committee are to study and propose the means to ensure the abolition of confessionalism, propose them to the Chamber of Deputies and the Ministers, and supervise the execution of the transitional plan.(3) During the transitional phase:
a. The confessional groups are to be represented in a just and equitable fashion in the formation of the Cabinet.
b. The principle of confessional representation in public servicejobs, in the judiciary, in the military and security institutions, and in public and mixed agencies are to be cancelled in accordance with the requirements of national reconciliation; they shall be replaced by the principle of expertise and competence. However, Grade One posts and their equivalents are exempt from this rule, and the posts must be distributed equally between Christians and Muslims without reserving any particular job for any confessional group but rather applying the principles of expertise and competence


*
Article 62 [Vacancy]Should the Presidency become vacant for any reason whatsoever, the Council of Ministers exercises the powers of the President by delegation.

Thursday, April 19, 2007

Possible Effects of Hizbulla's Maneuverings on the Sunni-Shia divide in Lebanon

Sound analysis of the Lebanese crisis over the course of the past couple of years -in the aftermath of Hariri's assassination and especially after the war last July -necessarily leads to the conclusion that the schism between the two sides of the Lebanese political spectrum can only widen. More dangerously, the effects of that schism can take on an increasingly sectarian image pitting Sunni against Shia.

A quick glance at what the future holds in store in the Lebanese political and legal arena shows two main events looming on the horizon - the presidential elections and the establishment of the international tribunal. In both cases Hizbulla and its allies, Nabih Berri and Michel Aoun are swimming upstream. There is not much they can do to stop the tribunal and even less to elect a president of their choice, both apparently objectives of the aptly named opposotion. To be precise, the only game they can play is one of hampering, obstruction and general bullying, which is exactly what they have been doing and will continue to do. The reason behind Hizbulla choosing to fight a losing battle is simple: the stakes are simply too high and eventhough the deck is stacked against them, Hizbulla have no choice (short of changing their very identity, ideology and MO) but to continue in their desperate tactics aimed at preventing the game from changing. But they have already lost that battle.

Naturally, with the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, there was no turning back the clock. But Hizbulla and its allies have not come to terms with that yet. In fact, they have tried various tactics to fill the vacuum that the Syrian overlords had left in their wake, the most obvious of which were bullying - political terror, so to speak - and instigating a war.

Recently, one can argue that more signs of hardening have started to emerge in their rhetoric and politics, whether by refusing to comment on the tribunal or by refusing the Arab proposed peace deal - even as Bashar is desperately trying to get Israel to engage him.

In any case, time moves forward and the direct Syrian era is fading into the background, but Hizbulla is becoming evermore associated in the eyes of many Lebanese with the opressors of a bygone era. With its goals of protecting Syria and imposing the will of the few, Hizbulla is playing a dangerous game. The Syrians were a foreign opressor, regardless of how "brotherly" our relationship with them should be. But Hizbulla is Lebanese, regardless of the foreign masters it serves. Its popular base is distinctly Lebanese, Shia to be specific. And as the stances of Hizbulla - from the rejection of a tribunal designed to investigate and try suspects in the brutal killing of a Sunni leader, to the rejection of a (Sunni) Arab launched peace initiative, to numerous other acts - start looking more and more like overtly sectarian behaviour shamelessly protecting murderous regimes at the expense of the interests of other communities in Lebanon (and of Lebanon as a state) - Hizbulla is putting its willing Shia base in an increasingly precarious situation, as the Sunni leadership in March 14 is becoming more and more comfortable with its Sunni identity, that can be a dangerous game to play...

Sunday, April 01, 2007

Now what ?

It is getting beyond ridiculous... If Lebanese bloggers the world could see all of the crap going on in Lebanon coming from as far back 2 years ago, and advocated a "seize the day" approach - lest we get to where we are now - why couldn't March 14's leadership.
Alas, historical opportunities were missed not once, or twice but at least three times over... Its nothing short of amazing. Gambling on the wrong horse once or twice could be a mixture of stupidity and lack of luck, but gambling on the losing horse every single time requires a certain kind of incompetence only Lebanese leaders possess. Lucky us...
So, in short, events now are just consequences of M14's failure to act, a consequence of the deal they struck with HA and Amal during elections, of the patriarch's inability to see beyond the position of the presidency (whatever the hell that means) and of Saad's political inexperience and servitude to Saudi, of their constant courting of Nabih Berri and failure to see him for what he really is. What we are seeing now is nothing short of the natural progression of events. You see, March 14 gave up the ball, lost the initiative, and allowed Syria and Iran's counter-revolutionaries to regroup, re-organize, steal the initiative and force at least a stalemate.
March 14 cannot give the opposition a third plus one of the positions in government, for that is "political suicide". Right. But why would March 8 accept anything less ? They have managed to stall government, which is useless without parliament - incidentally also stalled, not to mention the presidency which has been a lost cause for a while now.
Where can March 14 go from here? That is the main question. HOw can they regain the initiative? Many of us had an answer two years ago - it was called march to Baabda, resuggested a year ago, even possibly viable a few months ago, but I doubt that any feasible answer exists today. Until something changes - drastically - or until March 14 forces a change... But that goes counter to their very fabric.

Wednesday, February 21, 2007

Brace yourselves... Its gonna be a long long long ride

I have been relatively quiet throughout the events unfolding in Lebanon and the region in early 2007... mostly because there is nothing much to say in the way of analysis.

While there have been many developments, from Hezbollah's riots on a certain Tuesday that now seems so long ago, to the blow-back across universities two days later... all the way to the Ayn Aar bus bombings -shocking the country and yet shocking no one- and then the large, yet inane regurgitation plagued gathering on the anniversary of Hariri's assassination.

In the meantime, rumors of breakthroughs in "indirect" talks conducted through Iran and Saudi Arabia (woopdidoo) were circulating and proving to be vacuous. No compromises have yet materialized and I doubt any to materialize in the near future... I don't even know if I want to be wrong or not anymore - what difference does it make?

After all this is no longer primarily about Lebanon or its internal politics, March 8 succeeded at internationalizing Lebanese politics, and consequently our problems are becoming even less about Lebanon by the day. Amidst Saudi-Iranian talks and the Syro-Iranian coordination, as well as all that recent Iranian belligerency and their never-ending war games and display of divine weapons (probably imported from either russia or china and upgraded in Iran) countered by the leakage (or announcement, I forget) of American (contingency) plans to bomb the living crap out of all Iran's nuclear and military facilities... amidst all that, Lebanon's factions are becoming just cards to be played out in a much bigger regional game.

Bottom line, as Syria and Iran play for time waiting for a Godot that even they might not recognize, Lebanon simmers and starts showing signs of boiling. In the meantime the economy is tanking, state instutions are shackled and we are left at the mercy of... well I am not sure whose mercy we are at.

I am just asking myself what should we expect the near future to bring, knowing and fearing that its going to be more of the same - at best.

Friday, January 12, 2007

Give Them Enough Rope and They Will Hang Themselves

An Analysis of The March 14 Coalition Strategy Against the Hizbulla Led Opposition

It has been over a month since the Hizbulla led, Syro-Iranian backed opposition launched its campaign to topple the March 14 government which ironically they were part of. The campaign started with all the "opposition" ministers resigning and escalated with demonstrations in December and sit-ins in downtown Beirut demanding the resignation of Siniora's government. The opposition apparently tried to up the ante recently with the "Labor Union" staging demonstrations in front of various ministries objecting agains the government's reform plans and covertly the Paris III donor conference. Moreover, the speaker of parliament, Nabih Berri has refused to convene parliament effectively crippling the March 14 parliamentary majority...

In the face of pressure, the March 14 coalition simply held their ground. They staged counter demonstrations in many different Lebanese locales aimed at showing the popular support that the coalition enjoyed, called for the resigned ministers to rejoin the government and petitioned continuously for parliament to convene. The strategy seems to be simply to give the opposition enough rope to hang themselves. In other words, the government is simply letting the opposition make mistakes and escalate and burn bridges all the while somehow weakening them. What I continue to believe are half-measures and lack of initiative on March 14's side, seem to be "working" anyway. It appears that the opposition is running out of steam and/or struggling with internal squabbling resulting from the different intensity of political escalation which its various components (namely Hizbulla and Aoun's FPM) can withstand to achieve their various objectives and not lose popular support. The opposition continuously burned bridges over the past month and has not really offered anything in the way of an agenda except for toppling the government. As that goal seems further out of reach, I believe that they are now rethinking their strategy, counting to ten before taking further action.

Thus, the March 14ers seem to have the opposition caught in a deadlock or a stalemate which can only be broken through dialogue (either internally or with/amongst the foreign supporters of both camps). Assuming that the government manages to get the opposition to call off its campaign against Siniora, and to re-accept dialogue, it would achieve an important moral victory but nothing more.

The main issues that March 14 and March 8 disagree upon will not have been solved, the March 14ers will not have regained initiative and the March 8ers will still be able to play the impeding role that they have played since the inception of this government, serving Hizbulla's internal agendas as well as those of Iran and Syria. Upon closer inspection, I don't see that the eventual resolution of this particular conflict in favor of March 14 as useful in the resolution of the bigger conflict defined by establishing a certain high degree of Lebanese decision making capability, independent of (and sometimes against) Syrian and Iranian interest. One can even argue that March 14 is inherently incapable of such a challenge, but I won't get into that now.

Meanwhile, the political battle rages on, even though March 8 may have fumbled the ball on this one.

Friday, December 01, 2006

March 14, shape up or shut up...

Alright so Hizballa, Berri and Aoun have taken to the streets in huge numbers (regardless of the relative participation of each). They have shown what we already know, i.e. that they have the support of most of the Shia community and some of the Christian community.

I have previously argued, and continue to argue, that it is not politically intelligent for March 14 and government supporters to "stay home" as Jumblatt urged the March 14ers to do yesterday. A successful foreign initiative (doubtful) not withstanding, I have no doubt in my mind that the March 8 camp will continue to hold protests, camp out in downtown and escalate (as they themselves have promised numerous times) until Siniora's government falls.

You see, one has to be able to differentiate between the isolated demonstrations (even though they were huge) that March 14 organized after the Karami resignation and after each political assassination on one hand, and the sustained, continuous demonstrations, sit ins and political escalation that the aptly named current opposition (to everything not them) is planning and holding. March 14's post-Karami protests were just that, protests. This is sustained political pressure to achieve a well defined goal, and it is at its best.

At this rate, I don't think that Siniora's government will be able to hold for long if HA is to continue escalating. They look weak, and they look dependent on foreign support, and that is a recipe for failure. But the appearances are false. The Siniora government has the support of most of the Sunni and Druze communities and a lot of the Christians, it has the support of most of the upper middle class and of many of the seculars and academics, and it should show that to the world, and more importantly to the Lebanese. To the March 14 movement I say this:

If a million Lebanese people repeatedly took to the street to protest against the assassination of a person, why can't the same million people and more take to the streets to protest the assassination of hope, the prospect of democracy, and the dream of a stable prosperous future. The assassinated politicians were killed because, to their supporters, they were the symbols of that hope, now hope itself is being targetted. Is that not reason enough to mobilize? Have no doubt, this battle is for the future of Lebanon, and not taking action today will affect our tomorrow.

I still believe that if the opposition plan is to topple Siniora, then the best defence of the March 14 government is an offensive against the president. Bear in mind that if Siniora's government falls, then the country is indefinitely in the hands of the opposition, which also owns the positions of presidency and speaker of parliament, and thus practically no longer an opposition but a ruling party. Again that is simply unacceptable. If there is going to be a vacuum in the executive branch, then it should go all the way up. Prime minister for president, the simplest of equations. Then everything is in parliament's hands...

Restated briefly, there will be no civil war if March 14 takes to Baabda. The opposition is enforcing an equation: "Its my way or not at all". In response,
I think its time for March 14 to shape up and take action or shut up and abandon their cause, for good. The idea of a "Beirut Spring", a la Samir Kassir, is what gave me hope for the future, and I interpreted the independence uprising of March 14 partly as an embodiment of that hope. The so called opposition wants to hijack our future and align us with an axis of perpetual struggle. I prefer my struggles to be for a prosperous future, not ones initiated and sustained indefinitely by ideologues, demagogues, mullahs and dictators. If a peaceful future is the future that March 14 wants, then it is time to act. If the dystopia of "1984" is acceptable to them, then so be it, keep talking and don't take action. Either way, let us know, so we can abandon hope.

Wednesday, November 29, 2006

The cards have been dealt... Time for the showdown

In keeping with my tradition of diverging from the title of the post, I can't help but notice a convergence of the omens of doom, single file, in military formation under the leadership of the bearded one awaiting what has been dubbed the "zero hour"... On to the omens.

It seems that the flu of divine ligitimacy has spread to his holiness, general Aoun, who said (assafir) that they had reached the "stage of holy anger" (مرحلة الغضب المقدس) and added that "there will be no bloodletting, those who want to kill us can kill us, martyrdom is not only for Muslims" (wow and the guy is "secular"...), declaring that "our option is merge with our environment" (Syria? Iran? Political retro-Islam?) "because it protects everyone..."... Give me a break herr general...

Meanwhile, the other general, the one who sits at the helm of this wretched country of ours justified civil disobedience by government employees, citing disobedience in India at the time of Ghandi (So who exactly is Ghandi here? and who is the foreign oocupation? and since when has our beloved general turned president been a spiritual-intellectual figure?... Give me a break herr general...

About the same time, more signs whats to come "emanated" from Berri, who has shown his true colors and mettle yet another time, by declaring that there is no way now "to avoid the street even if its unwanted" (Really? Last I heard, free will was key, but then again that presupposes that you have it, and that you really don't want to hit the streets. I think both presuppositions are wrong...)

At this time, my only hope is in one of the institutions that I have a strong dislike for, the army. It is up to them to hold the peace, prevent rioting, clashes, and protect the government. What doesn't go for Lahoud, can't go for Siniora. Plain and simple. In the meantime, March 14 should finally grow a pair other than Jumblatt's and act rather than keep reacting, usually to murder, and by mass demonstrations whose numbers keep dwindling and by international whining. Enough!!!

The lines are drawn, and its obvious who is about to cross them. I suggest that March 14 pre-empt any "opposition" moves and mobilize its own public to camp in downtown, in defence of the Siniora government. The Siniora government should prove that it is worth defending, by appointing new ministers to replace the resigned 6 and murdered 1 and then wait for the general in baabda to sign, which he won't. At that point, it would be time to march to baabda... Take the initiative goddamnit...

Friday, November 24, 2006

Brinkmanship: you blink you lose...

A recent post, "To hell in a handbasket..." by Raja from lebanesebloggers, macabrely argues that the scenario by which Syria strikes a deal with the west and many prominent heads from the March 14 movement roll, may be the best for Lebanon's future. Such a conclusion pre-assumes that the alternative is nothing short of "tectonic plates colliding", i.e. civil war.

That in turn assumes that the parties involved, or some parties involved, are willing to take the country down that road. Ok, so lets look at who the parties involved are, and why none of them stand to gain from a civil war in Lebanon. If one agrees with the analysis that noone will take the last step towards such a bloodbath then you will also agree that the party that blinks first in this standoff, loses. But I am jumping the gun, so lets see why no-one wants a war:

Internal Forces

March 14 Unarmed, recently succesful at kicking the Syrian army out, looking forward to a stable country that they can rule, massively outgunned and outtrained by HA, has nothing to gain and everything to lose from a war.

Hizb Despite having a militia and hence the capability to wage war on the internal front, such a tactic would detract from their image in the arab world as freedom fighters and all that jazz and put them on the Shia side of a Sunni-Shia civil war. Moreover, this will take away precious resources that they would prefer to allocate to their "struggle" with their sworn enemy. It would embarass their lifelines in Iran and especially Syria and as I mentioned, isolate them in the arab world... On the other hand their "totalitarian" style ideology which seems incapable of adapting to or accepting the confessioanal nature of Lebanon, has put them in a situation where they cannot strategically gain without breaking March 14 completely. The question is how far can they go, and how clearly are they thinking...

Michel Aoun Ever the presidential wannabe, his entire polity is directed and governed by that dream. I do not see him gaining anything from a civil war.

Syria's Cronies It is completely pointless to analyze them individually, as they will simply follow Syrian orders.

External Forces

The US I cannot think of a reason whereby they would want to destabilize Lebanon, thereby increasing the chaos in the region especially with their pridicament in Iraq. Add to that I don't think they would want their ally Israel to have to deal with a volatile Lebanon where their northern border would be "uncontrolled"...

France The Chirac administration has proved to be an invaluable ally to the March 14 movement and whoever wins the election might be less enthusiastic towards supporting Lebanon, but in any case the fact that they have troops in teh South indicates that they would be genuinely interested in preserving a stable and safe environment there.

Syria Another Sunni-Shiite civil war on another of their borders, with them on the Shiite side and 70% of their population being Sunni, is nothing short of signing their own death sentence.
Moreover, in my opinion, their eggs are all in one basket. Killing the investigation and/or toppling the government and/or killing the March 14 leadership while trying to avoid a civil war that might be too much to handle and to check. In short desperate obstructionism... However the rationality of their decisions and the extent to which they are cornered might prove decisive in how crazy they might behave. Still history has shown them to be masters of brinkmanship without ever crossing the line. They realize that once the line is crossed, there is no turning back.

Iran The great unknown... also definitely the most influential player governing HA's decisions along with Syria. Notably however, they are the ideological parents of Hizb while Syria is onlt a strategic partner, a very crucial one though. That said, I wonder how connected are the timings of the G8 summit discussions on Iran and HA's cross border operation to capture the 2 israeli soldiers. Also, one has to wonder how cohesive the Iranian leadership is in its treatment of HA and how far they are willing to go in using HA as a pressure card against the west. Of course, I am sure they realize that by actually accepting a civil war in Lebanon, their card is burnt. So here again assuming a rational decision process implies that this player has stakes in avoiding the turmoils of internal war in Lebanon...

In Short

Under the very crucial assumption that all the internal and external players on the Lebanese arena are relatively rational and reasonable, the chances of any one of them pushing towards an escalation and a civil war is relatively small.

The only danger in my opinion is in the alliance of Syria, Iran and Hizbullah, not because they want a civil war but more because they might not see an alternative to it. In the case of the Syrian regime, desparation might (in the medium to long-range future) lead them to a point where they might decide to bring Lebanon down with them, or to think that a burning Lebanon might for some reason salvage their anomalous control of Syria. In the case of Hizbulla, the fact that they have been pushed away from the borders with Israel and are separated from their arch-enemies by thousands of international and Lebanese troops might challenge their very "raison d'etre". Moreover, the fact that they are armed to the teeth with nowhere to use these weapons and no enemy to channel them against might lead to them redefining the enemy internally. We are already seeing signs of that. Which brings me to Iran. They are the side I am worried about most, simply because they are in a situation they have never been before, and we have never seen them act under similar situations. What I am referring to is their new-found regional superpower status. With influences in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Bahrain, and perhaps even Kuwait, the Mullocracy has the power to both create and destroy which had been previously always checked by Saddam. To what extent are they willing to use Hizb in Lebanon, and would they push to a civil war? Their experience in Lebanese politics is more limited than other players and this lack of experience might cause decisions that are not hampered by previous pains...