The Myth of Resistance and The Myth of Lebanon

This blog has been quiet for months because this blogger did not see any changes in the political landscape that deviated from previous analysis and that required commentary. Arguably, the tragic events of the last few days were not unforseeable either. They have, however, been momentous.

First, I commend the magnificent job done by Lebanese bloggers Abu Kais , Jeha, Blacksmith Jade, and others in providing first hand analysis and breaking news. I could not bring myself to write during those times.

That said, I would like to give my own take on matters.


The government
The claim that the government's decision to dismantle Hizbulla's telecom network and to dismiss the chief of airport security was the direct cause of the rampage witnessed in Lebanon in the past few days is a loaded one at best. While it is true that at some high level the March 14'ers gravely miscalculated by either underestimating Hizbulla's response or overestimating the army's reaction to such a response or both, the truth remains that the organization, tactical efficiency, and speed with which Hizbulla orchestrated its rampage indicates that this was a preplanned assault awaiting nothing but an excuse.

Future Movement
Despite that, it is also clear that the Hariri component of March 14 was severely humiliated in its own centers of support in the capital which also happen to border Hizbulla centers of support. The consequences of that are yet to be seen, with the radicalization of the Sunnis being one strong option - with whatever effects on the strengtening or weakening of the Mustaqbal (Future) movement that may carry - and the increase in Sunni sectarian anger (read hate) against the Shias in general and Hizbulla in particular being a certainty.

Jumblatt and the PSP
On the other hand, the resistance offered by the (Druze/PSP) residents of Mount Lebanon and the Chouf and the reportedly high casualties that they managed to inflict on their Hizbulla assailants circumvented, with no small price paid by their own, a similar humiliation to the Druze - for now. This has arguably damaged and thwarted a consolidation of the negotiation leverage that Hizbulla may or may not have been seeking against its March 14 opponents. While they made a strong point for their military prowess in Beirut, they failed to make the same point in the mountains and in the Chouf.

The Christians
As for the Christian component of March 14, it has been untested so far. Michel Aoun's claim is that his stupid memorandum of understanding (read subservience) to Hizbulla has spared the Christians the rampage of the Hizb is at best hypocritical. What his statements so blatantly imply is that by capitulating to the Hizb, you can spare yourself from their terror. Unfortunately this is both dishonorable and false, and reduces the previous general to a satellite of and apologetic for a group of religious radicals.
In any case, the Christian component of March 14 can only stand to gain from the events of the last few days at the expense of the humiliation of the Future movement of Beirut and the resistance of the PSP elsewhere, provided that the onslaught of terror does not try to break into their areas.

Satellites to Radicals
With regards to the small parties orbitting around Hizbulla, it is unclear what the outcome is. The arms of the SSNP and similar parties were on display and they got a chance to show that they still exist on the streets. Beyond that, they need to remember that they mainly exist in areas were they are - to say the least - not liked and very likely in the future, not welcome. update: For example, Already there are indications that Talal Arsalan (Jumblatt's political foe among the Druze) has already lost a lot of his meagre support among the Druze. A similar conclusion also holds for Omar Karami's support among the Sunnis of the North. Moreover, the massacre of Halba committed against the SSNP shows how thin the ice these groups are walking on is.

Radicals and Myths
This leaves Hizbulla (and Amal). Arrogant, agressive, angry and self-righteous, the radical "Party of God" got a chance to display its MO in all of its "glory". Most notably they unleashed all their hatred against Hariri's legacy be it in the media or social and charitable organizations. The ease with which they captured and controlled west Beirut while the army stood watching probably emboldened them further. They believed that the next step would be the subjugation of the areas were Walid Jumblatt was popular. The resistance that they encountered in Choueifat, Aley, the Chouf and other areas was probably more than they had expected and the sad fact remains that they used artillary and mortar fire to try to crush those resisting them - while at the same time accusing their resistors of using heavy weaponry against them. Someone must have been reading Nazi history. To this point they have failed at gaining military ground despite overwhelming force, and while they most likely have the ability to eventually defeat the mountain residents what remains stunning to me is their use of heavy weaponry... This all serves to destroy the myth of a resistance dedicated to protecting Lebanon from the Israelis and comitted to using its weapons to that end only. To all those with eyes, ears and a functioning brain, this myth should be dead and buried by now.

As for the reprecussions and reactions on the regional and international fronts, that deserves a post on its own, and I will leave it to a future time.

In short
One could go on and on but I would like to end this post with two quotes. This first one was from an old post on this blog dated November 2006 - which I apparently like to repeat:

In the case of Hizbulla, the fact that they have been pushed away from the borders with Israel and are separated from their arch-enemies by thousands of international and Lebanese troops might challenge their very "raison d'etre". Moreover, the fact that they are armed to the teeth with nowhere to use these weapons and no enemy to channel them against might lead to them redefining the enemy internally. We are already seeing signs of that.

The second is by American satirist Ambrose Bierce who over a hundred years ago said that

... Democracy is defended in 3 stages. Ballot Box, Jury Box, Cartridge Box.

Unfortunately, parliament has failed us and is held hostage by Hizbulla and its allies, the judiciary has so far failed to uncover and try the assassins of the March 14 leadership, and the armed branches of the state have refused to use force to uphold the law in the face of terror.

The people were left to fend for themselves in this battle for Lebanon. That is the lesson that will be learned from this episode and that may be the most dangerous consequence of all, one that may put the final nail in the coffin of the myth of Lebanon.

Possible Effects of Hizbulla's Maneuverings on the Sunni-Shia divide in Lebanon

Sound analysis of the Lebanese crisis over the course of the past couple of years -in the aftermath of Hariri's assassination and especially after the war last July -necessarily leads to the conclusion that the schism between the two sides of the Lebanese political spectrum can only widen. More dangerously, the effects of that schism can take on an increasingly sectarian image pitting Sunni against Shia.

A quick glance at what the future holds in store in the Lebanese political and legal arena shows two main events looming on the horizon - the presidential elections and the establishment of the international tribunal. In both cases Hizbulla and its allies, Nabih Berri and Michel Aoun are swimming upstream. There is not much they can do to stop the tribunal and even less to elect a president of their choice, both apparently objectives of the aptly named opposotion. To be precise, the only game they can play is one of hampering, obstruction and general bullying, which is exactly what they have been doing and will continue to do. The reason behind Hizbulla choosing to fight a losing battle is simple: the stakes are simply too high and eventhough the deck is stacked against them, Hizbulla have no choice (short of changing their very identity, ideology and MO) but to continue in their desperate tactics aimed at preventing the game from changing. But they have already lost that battle.

Naturally, with the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, there was no turning back the clock. But Hizbulla and its allies have not come to terms with that yet. In fact, they have tried various tactics to fill the vacuum that the Syrian overlords had left in their wake, the most obvious of which were bullying - political terror, so to speak - and instigating a war.

Recently, one can argue that more signs of hardening have started to emerge in their rhetoric and politics, whether by refusing to comment on the tribunal or by refusing the Arab proposed peace deal - even as Bashar is desperately trying to get Israel to engage him.

In any case, time moves forward and the direct Syrian era is fading into the background, but Hizbulla is becoming evermore associated in the eyes of many Lebanese with the opressors of a bygone era. With its goals of protecting Syria and imposing the will of the few, Hizbulla is playing a dangerous game. The Syrians were a foreign opressor, regardless of how "brotherly" our relationship with them should be. But Hizbulla is Lebanese, regardless of the foreign masters it serves. Its popular base is distinctly Lebanese, Shia to be specific. And as the stances of Hizbulla - from the rejection of a tribunal designed to investigate and try suspects in the brutal killing of a Sunni leader, to the rejection of a (Sunni) Arab launched peace initiative, to numerous other acts - start looking more and more like overtly sectarian behaviour shamelessly protecting murderous regimes at the expense of the interests of other communities in Lebanon (and of Lebanon as a state) - Hizbulla is putting its willing Shia base in an increasingly precarious situation, as the Sunni leadership in March 14 is becoming more and more comfortable with its Sunni identity, that can be a dangerous game to play...

Lebanese Streets Burn...

They burn so that a megalomaniac leader of a foreign funded militia can try to improve his own and his masters' local and regional bargaining chips... after all everything pales when compared to divine causes... Simultaneously, another megalomaniac leader longs for the presidential palace in Baabda and urges his supporters onwards... to chaos... to destruction... anything for that palace in Baabda... Meanwhile, the army and security services watch "helplessly"...

I don't have much more to say. Just that these are desperation tactics and should be recognized as such and dealt with accordingly by March 14. Oh, and that I expect more escalation in the coming days, weeks and months.

For older analyses of the situation, and why none of these events are surprising, and why the future is easily predictable please see here, here, and especially here.

For the latest coverage and pictures please see here, here, here as well as here

Give Them Enough Rope and They Will Hang Themselves An Analysis of The March 14 Coalition Strategy Against the Hizbulla Led Opposition

It has been over a month since the Hizbulla led, Syro-Iranian backed opposition launched its campaign to topple the March 14 government which ironically they were part of. The campaign started with all the "opposition" ministers resigning and escalated with demonstrations in December and sit-ins in downtown Beirut demanding the resignation of Siniora's government. The opposition apparently tried to up the ante recently with the "Labor Union" staging demonstrations in front of various ministries objecting agains the government's reform plans and covertly the Paris III donor conference. Moreover, the speaker of parliament, Nabih Berri has refused to convene parliament effectively crippling the March 14 parliamentary majority...

In the face of pressure, the March 14 coalition simply held their ground. They staged counter demonstrations in many different Lebanese locales aimed at showing the popular support that the coalition enjoyed, called for the resigned ministers to rejoin the government and petitioned continuously for parliament to convene. The strategy seems to be simply to give the opposition enough rope to hang themselves. In other words, the government is simply letting the opposition make mistakes and escalate and burn bridges all the while somehow weakening them. What I continue to believe are half-measures and lack of initiative on March 14's side, seem to be "working" anyway. It appears that the opposition is running out of steam and/or struggling with internal squabbling resulting from the different intensity of political escalation which its various components (namely Hizbulla and Aoun's FPM) can withstand to achieve their various objectives and not lose popular support. The opposition continuously burned bridges over the past month and has not really offered anything in the way of an agenda except for toppling the government. As that goal seems further out of reach, I believe that they are now rethinking their strategy, counting to ten before taking further action.

Thus, the March 14ers seem to have the opposition caught in a deadlock or a stalemate which can only be broken through dialogue (either internally or with/amongst the foreign supporters of both camps). Assuming that the government manages to get the opposition to call off its campaign against Siniora, and to re-accept dialogue, it would achieve an important moral victory but nothing more.

The main issues that March 14 and March 8 disagree upon will not have been solved, the March 14ers will not have regained initiative and the March 8ers will still be able to play the impeding role that they have played since the inception of this government, serving Hizbulla's internal agendas as well as those of Iran and Syria. Upon closer inspection, I don't see that the eventual resolution of this particular conflict in favor of March 14 as useful in the resolution of the bigger conflict defined by establishing a certain high degree of Lebanese decision making capability, independent of (and sometimes against) Syrian and Iranian interest. One can even argue that March 14 is inherently incapable of such a challenge, but I won't get into that now.

Meanwhile, the political battle rages on, even though March 8 may have fumbled the ball on this one.

Hizbulla clashes with UNIFIL in South Lebanon?

Annahar reported the following in its Tuesday edition:

اشتباك في الخرايب بين قوة فرنسية و"حزب الله"

الجنوب – "النهار":

أفادت مصادر مطلعة ان قوة من الكتيبة الفرنسية اشتبكت ليل السبت الماضي مع عناصر من "حزب الله" في خراج الخرايب – المجادل، وحصل اطلاق نار استدعى تدخل الجيش اللبناني اثر تفتيش القوة الفرنسية خراج هذه المنطقة وأماكن استخدمها "حزب الله" نقاطا أمنية ومنها المغاور، بحثا عن أسلحة.



Translation:

Informed sources reported that a force from the French Battalion (UNIFIL) clashed on Saturday night with members of Hizbulla on the outskirts of the village of AlKhrayeb-AlMjadel. An exchange of fire took place which called for the interference of the Lebanese army after the French unit searched this area and others that Hizbulla used as security points (?) including caves, in search of weapons.

Update
Almustaqbal reported Wednesday that UNIFIL and Lebanese security sources denied that there were any clashes with Hizbulla...

Coup d'etat, Coup d'etat, Coup d'etat

There is no other reasonable explanation. None. In the context of the opposition's behaviour, i.e. upping the ante in the face of the "Arab initiative" of Amr Mousa, demanding early elections under a new law (to be drafted by which government and parliament pray tell?)

Naturally, the opposition leaders are not stupid. They realize full well that what they are asking for cannot be granted by the March 14'ers and that is the reason why they are asking for it.

Something is cooking in Tehran, and it sure don't smell good.

In the context of the regional developments, tying in Lebanon with Palestine and Hamas's acceptance then refusal then acceptance then refusal... of a national unity government, followed by Abu Mazen's apparent intention to call for an early election and the infighting on the streets of Gaza that followed... In this context, added with Syria's apparent overtures towards Israel and Bashar's meeting with Putin and the Syro-Iranians apparently banking on the weakness of G.W.B domestically (i.e. in the States), it becomes apparent that the Syro-Iranians are negotiating, playing their own game of carrot and stick with the west. With GWB in particular. But they want a price.

In the subtle mix of chess and poker that the Syro-Iranians are playing with the West, it is not yet time for appeasement in Lebanon. For that would be a loss.

The name of the game: change the rules of the game

I have argued previously, and continue to argue that it is completely unacceptable to Syria and to Hizbulla and its allies that the March 14ers control government and parliament then elect a president and thus complete their revolution. Hence, the HISHee alliance cannot back down just yet. They need to change the rules of the game to something more favorable to them. One such way is a coup d'etat.

The March 14'ers better be ready for it, coz its coming.

Update (hat tip Abu Kais)
According to various news sources (e.g. reuters, naharnet and the bbc), Lebanese "police say they have arrested at least four people and seized a large amount of explosives from homes in Lebanon. Those detained were not named by police but security sources said they were members of a pro-Syrian Lebanese party, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party."

Now to all of you out there that are demonstrating against the government, thinking that this is nothing more than a democratic means of expression pleaaaaaase know full well that no matter how well meaning YOU might be, there are those among you that have different plans and that no matter how much you think that what you are doing is in the spirit of democracy, no democratic means can justify an undemocratic end.

Why its going to get worse before it gets better

In no particular order, the top reasons why the situation in Lebanon is going to get worse before it gets better:

1 - Because Lahoud's term is not over till late 2007.
2 - Because Hizbulla has lost its resistance card and needs to redefine itself, and has so far failed.
3 - Because Brammertz's final report is not out yet and the tribunal has not been finalized and nobody has been charged.
4 - Because of reason 3, the Syrians are worried and will do their best to impede the government and hence (they believe) the tribunal.
5 - Because Hizbulla and its external allies need access to the government to impede both Unifil and the tribunal.
6 - Because March 14 has failed to be pro-active and has been on the defensive and reactive side ever since they won the parliamentary elections.
7 - Because the Arabs have started mediating and the mediators have immediately acknowledged (implicitly) Syria's role by visiting it.
8 - Because the Arabs have no interest in a prolonged standoff and may be willing to sell out on their March 14 allies to force an unfavorable deal.
9 - Because the nature of the sectarian beast in Lebanon has made the level with which the communities detest each other dangerously high, to the extent that any compromise is unacceptable to them.

They are not playing with fire... they are the fire!!!

According to naharnet, one person was killed (a shia) while others were wounded in clashes between sunnis and shias in a predominantly (poor)sunni area of beirut. The question that one must ask himself is why are the members of the opposition, namely HA so bent on playing with fire. They are fully aware that they are intimidating and antagonizing the Sunni areas of Beirut. They are fully aware that the Sunnis are extremely upset and feel like this is a Shia coup directed at them, otherwise why would the Sunni mufti lead prayer in the Seraille.

Also recently, a Syrian national was arrested (source needed) after he had cursed at Nasralla in front of the latter's supporters and then fled towards the predominantly Christian are of Ashrafieh... I wonder what that was about.

Its time to wake up and smell the coffee, and the stench of a coupe d'etat... Its time to see the Syrian plot for what it really is: a plan to spread chaos to lebanon. What better way to escape all the troubles that they are facing, than to plunge Lebanon, after Iraq into chaos... I don't know if they are calculting properly or not, because I am not sure about the reaction in Syria, but thats a different story.

For the time being it is time for this coup d'etat/counter-revolution masquerading as a demonstration to end, in any way possible, while a war is still avoidable. If it doesn't end soon, march to baabda. It just might be the best way to direct the tension and turn the tables.