Great Strides.... Backwards!

I came across the recent (2008) Foreign Policy "Failed States Index" where I was proud to find out that Lebanon is steadily and surely making its way to the top of the list.

We are now number 18 on the list and by overtaking such worthy opponents as Ethiopia, North Korea, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan, we can claim the coveted poll position. We should be careful though, we don't want to slip to position 19 since Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Yemen are tight on our heels. In fact we can take pride in being much more a failed state than either Rwanda and Angola, countries with life expectancies of 47 and 37 respectively.

Even more worrying than our current position on the list, is our trend in the last few years. Taking a look at the table below ( lifted from the Fund for Peace which co-authored the index), we can see all the red arrows indicating that the trends are heading for even more failure of the state.


Demographic pressures are increasing, as is the number of refugees and displaced people. Group grievances are on the rise. Human flight, uneven development, are increasing and the legitimacy of the state is getting worse... You name it and its getting worse.

Also worth mentioning is that there is at least one component that is clearly correlated to the failure of states, as is apparent from this next table.

Our parliament having been decommissioned for so long now has contributed its share of damage.

Of course, every single one of these indicators can be explained and none of this is remotely surprising; however, the fact that a catastrophe is predictable or explainable does not make it any less alarming. We need a paradigm shift in the way politics are conducted in Lebanon. Unfortunately, any shift that is restricted to the upper echelons of the elite - as unlikely as that is looking - is also purely temporary. The only paradigm shift that will really be of use, is one that the citizens will have to make. For example... by actually becoming citizens.

Now if only pigs could fly.

Deal Reached in Doha: Great Step or a Step Backwards?

It seems to be true. Our feuding leaders have reached an agreement under Qatari and Arab supervision/arm bending/baby sitting.

The Good
Some (for example Michel Murr in his LBC interview) see this as a great victory for Lebanon and the Lebanese and a step towards prosperity, and they may have a point or two. The interviews with politicians from Doha seem nothing like the rhetoric of just a few days ago, and one may hope that the politicians are serious about keeping the discourse peaceful and civilized. As much as I would like to believe in this rosy picture, I tend not to.

The Bad
For one, nothing could hide the fact that this is just another piece of strong evidence that our consensual sectarian democracy is a disaster. In fact, even if (especially if?) we disregard the shameful coup, raids and counter raids that plagued the prelude to Doha, we have to realize that it took the Arab league, the Qatari Emir, all his relationships with regional and international powers, and no small amount of cajoling and hard diplomacy to forge a deal that can only be objectively viewed as a defeat to Democracy first and perhaps to March 14 - but only as a distant second.

That our country needs foreign mediators to resolve a national crisis is a testament to the failure of the current Lebanese political and social culture. That even then, no serious issues were solved in Doha, but only a power sharing agreement was reached is a testament to the lack of a will for progress and a consecration of the patronage mentality that has plagued us for centuries. That most of the terms of the agreement are easily in favor of the opposition is a testament to the usefulness of possessing arms and using them to forge a political agreement that is favorable. Hizbulla did it at the cost of a sectarian schism that may take years to heal. That our leadership manages to polarize our public on a sectarian basis by using violence is a testament to our ever-continuing lack of a national identity. That our army's cheerleading a coup is lauded as wise behaviour that preserved its unity is a testament to the malaise that plagues our social fabric.


The Ugly Truth
The truth is that regardless of winners, losers and political analysis of the deal, the bottom line is that between the inaction of the army prior to Doha, the subsequent capitulation of the goverment to Hizbulla's demands, and then the agreement in Doha on the election of Michel Sleiman, the adoption of the (modified) 1960 electoral law for one time only of course, the absence (as of yet) of a clear statement about the weapons of Hizbulla, and the forging of a power sharing agreement between Lebanese political factions outside of Lebanese political institutions, one thing remains truer than ever.

Our constitution, the Taif accord, our parliament, our government institutions, our police, and our army, are worth nothing. Indeed both our archaic societal structure and our political culture need to be reformulated on sound principles if we want to avoid repeating our shameful history - as we usually do - in the near future. But in the meantime, preytell, now that they are reinforced, what do we do about Hizbulla, their weapons, their ideology and their methods?

Early indications that the Arab delegation will fail

Not that anyone had any hopes that the Arab delegation would succeed at mediating between the pro-government and anti-government factions in Lebanon, but there are more early indications that they are predestined to fail. FOr example, NowLebanon reports (emphasis mine):

12:00 Head of airport security Wafiq Choucair and resigned Foreign Minister Fawzi Salloukh await the arrival of the Arab Ministerial Committee at Rafik Hariri International Airport.

If true, this is more needless display of force, this time of the political kind. I read this as juvenile behaviour aimed only at "rubbing it" in the face of the government's (useless) Arab allies, reminding them of the facts on the ground. In the same vain, Future TV (whose objectivity at this point is more in question than it was before) is also reporting a heavy presence of Hizbulla members along the airport road. This kind of behaviour will only serve to deepen the rift between said allies and the Syria/Iran axis. Unlike some hopeful observers, I don't see any of what happened in the last few days as hastening a solution to the political crisis, but only precipitating it - highlighting the nature of the events of the last few days as a coup - and expanding the crisis further both locally and regionally.

I could be wrong. In fact, I hope I am wrong, but I doubt it.

Soldiers, Civilians Arrested - Implications

Apparently, 6 civilians and 11 soldiers (including 3 officers) were arrested in the aftermath of the January 27th clashes between the army and protesters who had "spontaneously" rioted against electricity cuts. Investigations were launched after several protesters from Amal and Hizbullah had been killed in unclear circumstances with opposing Lebanese sides hurling accusations at one another and interestingly, at the army.

I for one am completely for the rule law and support the arrest of all individuals - military and civilian - involved in either breaking the law, abusing authority and endangering or taking lives.

What is disconcerting however is that there have been several brazen attacks on army barracks and checkpoints, which according to the army "serves Israel's interest" but somehow not Syria's.

I seriously hope - but clearly do not expect - that all these "incidents" be investigated and the perpetrators brought to justice. The loss of life that occurred on that fateful day in January is more than deplorable and the nonchalance with which the Lebanese treat each other's lives and well being is more than despicable. This goes for the leaders whose rhetoric can only fuel violence, hatred and dangerous "spontaneous" riots. It goes for the army and security forces whose attempts to quell the riots are unprofressional and open the door to confrontations that lead to confusion and loss of life. It also goes for the Lebanese people who pimp themselves to the wills of domestic and foreign leaders at the expense of their own safety, prosperity, and well-being.

In any case, I can only wonder at the circumstances surrounding the investigation, from the threats and warnings that the opposition hurled at the army and its commander in chief, regarding his almost botched bid for presidency, to the spew of attacks against army baracks and outposts... It make me wonder about the kind of message being sent when some of the only perpetrators brought to justice in 2 years time are military personnel - while the people who attack the army roam free.

The oppostion, the government and especially both their supporters, not to mention the leadership of the army and security forces, should all pause to think about the consequences of their actions and about the strain they are placing not only on the fabric of Lebanese society but on the fabric of one of the supposedly secular institutions that is supposed to safeguard it - the army.

Omen (and other stuff)

I am not one to believe in omens but this particular crow seems to always be a harbinger of doom (usually of the political assassination type).

On a more grounded note, what is most telling about Franjieh's rant is not necessarily the attack on the "old man of the mountain" (to borrow a reference from Shunkleash), but the vehement attacks on both the Arab League initiative and the supposedly consensual presidential candidate the details whose presidency the AL is negotiating on. Clearly nothing has ever materialized from any Arab League initiative ever, so this one in particular was bound to be blown out of the water (so nothing to see there). On the other hand, it is the (stupid) honesty with which Franjieh states that the opposition does not trust Michel Suleiman that further confirms my previous feeling that the general's candidacy has turned into a dud. Of course, I could be wrong and his presidency could materialize but would itself turn into a dud. Whichever...

Either way, Suleiman should just give this Arab League initiative a chance to fail completely and then declare that he does not want the post of president anymore. His wings have been pre-emptively clipped. The questions is whether he cares.

Reassessment ?

Preamble
I have had a hard time posting anything of value lately, mostly because the situation in Lebanon is so downright repulsive that I could not bring myself to sit down and write anything useful that the Lebanese blogosphere has not already successfully and repetitively tackled...

Perhaps at the risk of breaking that trend, in this post I intend to briefly examine the current impasse in Lebanon from the context of the power struggle between the various political factions in Lebanon, the regional players, and the international ones, as well as the interplay among them.

For anyone who reads this post, I ask that you be patient with me as I try to dissect the situation and that you keep in mind that I am doing this as much for my understanding of the Lebanese impasse as for anything else.

Zoom Out
It may be quite useful to take the current delays in voting in a new president as simply another skirmish in the battle for Lebanon. Clearly the battle for Lebanon, from an international perspective, is to be taken in the context of the diplomatic war being waged between Syria and Iran on one hand and the West on the other. Nothing has changed from that perspective. Except that the momentum seems to have shifted, for various reasons.

Rewind
In particular, in the immediate aftermath of the Hariri assassination and the ensuing intense international and local Lebanese pressure the momentum was clearly in favor of the March 14 movement and its international sponsors thereby forcing the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon. Furthermore, the Mehlis era of the international investigation put extreme pressure on the Syrians and on their March 8 allies placing them in a distinctively defensive position. March 14 managed to consolidate some gains with a government composed mainly of their people but failed miserably to push the envelope any further by ousting Lahoud.

Since then, blunder after blunder on the March 14 side and a cooling of the pressure put by the international investigation under Brammertz led to the momentum slowly shifting to the March 8 side. Moreover, the aftermath of the July war between Hezbollah and Israel has proved to be a particularly miserable time for the March 14'ers with the offensive shifting to the opposition which even tried (and failed) to topple the government.

Fast Forward
After the continuing ebb and flow between government and opposition, and more generally between March 14 and March 8, and more globally between the West and the Syro/Iranian axis, there seems to be a certain equilibrium that has been reached, a certain balance of power. The trenches are dug and the opposing sides are unable to gain much ground.

Zoom In
While the internal balance of power is understandable given everything that has happened and the possible incompetence of March 14 in managing the crisis to their favor, one question that remains is whether it would be possible for them to regain the upper hand?

The Big Picture
Well, to answer that question, one must look at the current stalemate and examine the possible ways to break it, but more importantly one must understand that any risk taken could result in defeat rather than victory. Thus it becomes important to assess the possible gains in taking any risky maneuvers, weighing them against the risk factor and making an educated guess as to whether the maneuver is worth it. Finally, it is imperative that the decision reached be based upon a sober analysis of the above factors.

In the Blue Corner
As far as March 8 is concerned, the strategy that they are employing is mainly summarized by: impede, impede, impede. In the background, plan B lurks (whether or not it would be put into action) and the March 14ers know it. More precisely, in case March 14 chooses to try something that March 8 considers bold or threatening, the M14ers have to do it with the implicit threat of civil disorder - or worse - by their opponents and the tightly controlled Hizbollah crowd.

While they impede and hold their opponents in check with the threat of chaos, the M8ers don't really have a victory strategy apart from waiting for the current parliament to either finish its 4 year mandate or for enough M14 MP's to spontaneously combust so that the majority in parliament shifts.

In the Red Corner
On the other hand, the M14 cards have quickly run out, and all they can do is threaten with a 50+1 election of a new president or with a government initiated amendment of the constitution in favor of an army chief who at best is an unknown commodity. The latter option is being impeded, while the former is held in check with the opposition's implicit threat of chaos.

Thus, it is most likely that the internal balance cannot be broken without outside assistance that has to be real, understood, appraised and efficiently utilized.

Weight of the Supporting Cast
Clearly the M8ers have solid political and logistic support from the Syrians and solid political and financial support from the Iranians. However, they are incapable of helping their allies deliver a KO to the March 14ers for fear of international retribution. Thus the M8ers support is real, understood, appraised and insufficient for a KO.

Similarly, March 14 has (semi-?)solid international support and (weak ?) Arab support that keeps the opposition from leveraging its external allies/sponsors' superior financial and logistic support into a clear victory. However, for one reason or another March 14 seems incapable of leveraging its own external support into victory. Namely, their own indecisiveness has proven crippling, and the constant European and occasional American engagement of Syria has possibly instilled doubt into the March 14ers minds and made them refrain further from any bold gestures. Thus, March 14 knows it is supported but does not know for sure how much, or how far its international supporters would back it should chaos erupt, or how useful such support would be. Moreover, even if it does understand all of that, M14 may not be willing to live with the consequences of chaos. All that uncertainty seems to be crippling M14 which seems to be just dancing around the ring waiting for their opponent to slip up. Their time would be better spent waiting for Godot.

Assessment: In Brief
It is thus more and more clear that this is not a time where a clear victory can be expected from (and by) either side. The crisis is being managed and political battles are being fought slowly, with a backdrop of assassinations and possible (real/perceived) instability. It seems that those are the now accepted rules of the game. In any case, now that the president will be either the increasingly unlikely army general or an inconsequential other, the opposition seems resigned to live with the M14 government while trying to haggle for position in the next.

Back to The Future
Moreover, as the clock ticks on the international tribunal, the presidential election, and the ensuing government, the current parliament trudges slowly closer to the end of its term without a viable electoral law in place. As that further deadline looms closer and closer, and as the regional and international players fail to force the other side's hand, the only internal possibility to break the stalemate seems to be either a bold M8 move in the direction of chaos, or a bold M14 move in the direction of electing a 50+1 president that is not Suleiman - or both. Of course, another distinct possibility is a gradual softening of stances from some of the individual components of one side or both sides, maybe even leading to realignment...

Reassessment: In Briefer
The most likely option, based on the above, is more of the same. Meanwhile, the players seem to accept the new rules of the game, and will most likely play by them. It is still a stare down.

Presidential Musings

Aside from the rightful and righteous indignation that many bloggers are displaying around the nomination of Michel Sleiman as a consensus candidate, both the timing of the move and its nature sparked some questions and observations that I found interesting.

1- Purely out of interest, I am just wondering what rabbit out of the hat are our beloved MPs going to pull to amend the constitution, when constitutionally they cannot amend the constitution this time - one time only or otherwise. In other words, not only is it deplorable that they are considering the same trick that our overbearing neighborly previous occupier (you know which one I am talking about) used to pull, but it is also explicitly illegal this time.

2- How on Earth can there be no audible cries of indignation from within M14 (say from the nominees whose candidacy is being scuttled) or especially from within the M14 crowd - say from the 1% that actually demonstrated a long long time ago in a galaxy far far away, for something rather than somesect or someone. Oh right, those 1% where guided by principles personified in assassinated journalists, and arguably even led by said assassinated journalists...

3- How about that timing? I mean Sleiman's candidacy was up for discussion when it was still possible to legally disregard the constitution and amend it for one time only, for the 4th time in a row. Why was it inconceivable back then and why is it ok now. What changed ?

4- Which brings us to Annapolis. The big unknown as far as I am concerned. There are fears that some sort of deal was struck between the US and Syria with the Saudis having some hand in it. Who the hell knows.

5- Of course, there is also the distinct possibility that M14 (read the big 3 in M14) having gotten rid of Lahoud (as in by virtue of the passage of time) without him reverting to trigerring the formation of a second government, felt that it had won a minor (major ?) victory and hence felt that it was capable of compromising a little bit with the opposition. You know, with the president having no powers save from stalling the passage of time - who in M14 really cares ?

6- But then again, why Michel Sleiman? I mean fine, he is widely respected bla bla, but he is also not constitutionally allowed to run, and parliament is not allowed to mess with the constitution at this time - not that, this would stop Lebanese parliamentarians, the eternal guardians of the republic, the constitution and the rule of law. But I digress. So if you are M14, why pick a maneuvre that is so morally and legally weak, on the grounds of averting a civil war. Especially when I am sure that out of at least tens of thousands of eligible (and apparently willing) Maronites, there must be one other candidate who can avert the threat of civil war, i.e. be non-threatening to Hizbulla and Syria...


It all just doesn't make sense to me, and my feeling is that this won't go through. Of course I am basing my argument on the premise that nothing substantial has changed. Otherwise, in such a short time, much has changed on the international, regional and possibly national levels that we don't know about and that our politicians feel that they do.

On Compromise

It is naive to assume that a compromise or "consensus" president is anything but ridiculous. Simply put, the objective of a compromise is to achieve a working solution that is somewhat satisfactory to both sides.

1- To be able to understand what is satisfactory to someone, you have to be able to understand their objectives. Which brings us to why a so-called compromise with Syria via her allies is not only naive, but also counterproductive. Anyone who believes that anything short of the complete elimination of the tribunal, and of hegemony over Lebanon would be satisfactory to the Syrian regime is delusional. As such, compromising now is tantamount to giving them a new tool to exert pressure on Lebanon for another 6 yrs.

2- On the other hand, "consensus" on the part of March 8 cannot mean anything less than a lame-duck president who will agree to "protect" the resistance and their ever increasing arsenal of weapons, and hence ignore the elephant in the room for another six years.

3- Not to mention that a consensus president is a slap in the face of actual democracy (as opposed to the farcical least common denominator consensual democracy), and a concession to a policy of assassination and terror, whereby a working majority whose members are being picked off one by one decides to concede defeat, forfeit its right to exercise its majority, and "voluntarily" hands over power as the other side threatens civil war.

4- Moreover, the question of consensus between March 14 and March 8 is rather silly. We all know that the maximum that they can achieve, if anything at all, is agree on a name. In all likelihood, the person whose name they agree on - our next president - will be an inconsequential fool with no popular support whatsoever. Thus making an almost ceremonial position whose only real power is to impede even more ceremonial.. Of course, by compromising here, M14 is opening the door to the next question, that of a national unity government, on which they will have to compromise again in the face of threats of unrest and civil war - in other words blackmail.

5- Needless to say that the "compromise" president, if the necessary 4 members of the majority are assassinated before a new government is formed, or after a national unity government where the opposition resigning would fell the government, would be obliged to consult with parliament on the name of a new prime minister. Of course at that time, the majority may have shifted and we would have a pro-Syrian PM and a useless president.

6- As for the pros of consensus, well that would ensure that nobody would make good on their threats of unrest and war for the short term.

On Inevitability - Lebanon

It has been relatively clear that Lebanon is headed on a spiralling path - back to revisit its own tragic past. The new generation destined to repeat the tragedies of their fathers and forefathers albeit with a new twist or two... My problem is not with the inconsistencies that the Lebanese have inherited, but that once again, Lebanon comes face to face with its contradictions and only realizes it when its too late to mend.

That aside, and all international politics aside for a second; the "program" of Hezbollah, for example, has never been in line with the "vision" of Lebanon as a tolerant country and a home to (oppressed) minorities. On the other hand, the Lebanese themselves have never acted in line with that vision and in fact often act against it when given the chance. Our history is riddled with instances of one or two minorities oppressing the others, and I don't recall there ever being a period of internal harmony. This is simply because the "ideologies" and programs of the minorities run so opposed to one another. Given the chance, why not impose your will and your program - especially since the ideologies cannot coexist peacefully?

Naturally, no stable equilibrium can be achieved when there are forces pulling in different directions so strongly that the very fabric of the state is compromised.

And while the Syrians (i.e., the regime) made a living in Lebanon out of directing these forces inwards or neutralizing them to keep the country "lucrative" - politically by remaining relevant on the international scene and financially through corruption - they are no longer physically there, so they now exert an external force of their own. They understand the inconsistencies in Lebanon very well, only this time it serves them to tear Lebanon apart.

Contrary to popular belief, I doubt that left to their own devices the Lebanese would do more than oppress each other. Viewed from that light, external politics are minor in that they cannot prevent the conflict that is so inherent to the fabric of the little country. What international players can do, however, is influence the result - and aftermath - of the seemingly impending clash.

Whether things can be resolved peacefully depends on whether any side would agree to lose peacefully, which is clearly not only doubtful but answered in the negative, both historically and more recently.

The conclusion is clear, I just don't think anyone of us can stomach mouthing it.

Bleak...

From the infiltration of SyroQaedic groups to Lebanon, to the war that one of them is waging against the Lebanese army in the north, to the assassination of yet another member of the March 14 alliance, to the spree of sporadic bombing of Lebanese towns, to the growing possibility of more unrest from Syrian supported Islamic or puppet Palestinian groups, the Syrian regime is feeling the heat, and is turning it on Lebanon.

Meanwhile, Lebanon stands helpless. With every bomb exploding, every civilian, every soldier, every politician, or every journalist killed, the feeling of helplessness grows and the gap that divides the Lebanese grows with it into an everwidening schism.

March 14 stands helpless, with no real plan, clawless and toothless, unable and unwilling... March 8 stands silent despite the noise it makes, refusing to appease, unrelenting in its obstructionism, complicit...

All the while, whatever diabolical scheme that our brotherly neighbors have hatched for the destruction of Lebanon comes to dark fruition.

Regardless of whatever eventually happens in Syria or to its regime, I am not sure that the fragile fabric of Lebanese society can recover...

Everything seems to point towards an increase in violence and an increase in the turmoil, with chaos peaking around the time of the presidential election... The question that looms large is whether or not Lebanon can survive in one piece (assuming it still is in one piece) till then and more ambitiously past that, or whether we are looking at a Gaza like future...

On Inevitability - Revisited

In a previous post, I tried to tackle the issue of the inevitability of certain outcomes, once something monumental takes place. Saddam's eventual (violent) demise was one example I had in mind, and I tried to extrapolate to Iran. My point was that if Iran continues to play this game of cat and mouse with the international community, namely the Americans, eventually it will pay the price - in the form of military intervention ( whether American or Israeli... ).

In any case, in this post the "inevitability" that I have in mind is slightly different in nature. I have been pre-occupied with the inevitability of the Syrian regime being a detrimental force in the region for as long as it exists (hence the inevitability of its own demise- but that is not my point for the moment).

Michael Totten , in the comments section of a recent post on his blog insightfully states that "... the Syrian regime wouldn't survive without being in a state of cold war or proxy war with Israel. It can't survive peace, and it can't survive hot war."

In fact, the Syrian regime of the Assads has a history (and a method of survival) of living in the grey area between peace and war with Israel.

In the era prior to the Hariri assassination, the Syrians could not afford to sign peace with Israel, lest they lose their pretext for occupying Lebanon. After all, what are the Golan Heights, economically and politically, compared to their smaller neighbor.

In the era following the Hariri assassination, the Syrians inevitably lost Lebanon, but does that mean that they can negotiate a peace with Israel? I really wonder. It seems that the number one priority for the Syrians right now is regime survival at any cost - to Syria's neighbors of course. From acting as a transit route and haven for terrorists heading to Iraq, to inflaming the situation in the Palestinian territories via its manipulation (in conjunction with every one's favorite Mullocracy) of Palestinian factions, to inciting its allies in Lebanon to unreasonable escalation, to exporting Jihadi terrorists to Lebanon as well (as highlighted by the tragic events in Lebanon this week)... the Syrian regime has to ensure its survival by making itself "relevant".

By doing so, however, the Syrians may have become too relevant. It is becoming more and more understood that one of the main common factors of the three unstable neighbours of Syria, is ... well ... Syria. The regime wants to negotiate, and as the Americans refuse to negotiate, the regime raises the stakes higher and higher.

Eventually, one of two things will happen - one more likely than the other of course.

Either the Americans and the Europeans will concede, handing Lebanon back to the Syrians, and naturally emptying the international tribunal on the Hariri killing of any substance, paving the way to the Syrian signing of peace with Israel. In return, the Syrians will tighten border security, expel Hamas and co from Damascus, cut off logistic and political support for Hizbulla, and so on...

I see such an outcome as unlikely, others may disagree (more on this in a later post).

The other possible eventuality is that as the Syrians dig deeper into this ever spiralling game of sowing uncertainty and instability in their surroundings, they risk severe blow back. After all, three neighboring countries in a (current/possible future) state of civil war, will inevitably have consequences on the Syrian interior. More importantly (on the short term), the more the Syrians make themselves "relevant", the more their "peskiness" becomes a threat. And as that happens there will be an ever growing bulls-eye on the regime's back.

In the meantime, they have no choice. Syrian Peace with Israel without the regime regaining Lebanon or at least resolving the tribunal issue is impossible. By the same token, war with Israel is regime suicide... but so is an indictment of regime officials in a tribunal on the assassination of a former prime minister of a neighboring country.

Consequently, destabilizing Lebanon is a priority for Syria; the tribunal -to them-must become irrelevant, or at least negotiable. Viewed from that lens, the recent madness they unleashed from the refugee camps in (for now) the north of Lebanon and the sporadic explosions rocking Lebanon's cities become less surprising though no less appalling, or despicable...

An eventuality to ponder on here is whether or not the (alleged (for now)) Syrian assassination of Hariri will prove to be the fatal mistake that will eventually be the Assads' undoing - just as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was Saddam's eventual undoing - despite all the macabre maneuverings of the Syrian regime at the expense of the blood of the innocent in at least three of its neighboring countries...

On the Presidency

While it may be true that there we will see some level of perpetuation of the political paralysis in Lebanon even after Lahoud's term is over, it is also true that Lahoud himself has been an exceptional obstruction. Moreover, it is true that with the coming end of his term, Lebanon has to potentially deal with a new crisis stemming from the very divisive issue of electing a new president.

As previously mentioned, Lahoud has been a huge obstructive factor in Lebanese political affairs. He has refused to sign many many bills, refused to accept many foreign ambassadors (while he has also not outright rejected them), impeded the appointment of Lebanese ambassadors to foreign countries and obstructed the hiring and promotion of high level public servants, and so on and so forth...

That could all change with a vacant presidency or a March 14 president.

Moreover, huff and puff and do what they may, March 8 realizes that the government is legit. The constitution is clear and everything else is propaganda^. In fact, what we are seeing on their part is desperate politics. Hizbulla is desperate to protect its Syrian ally/master from the tribunal and to protect itself from the possible evolution (for better or worse) of Lebanon and its transition into a stable (?) post Syrian era. It needs to find a formula that guarantees its ability to operate within a framework as similar as possible to the one it operated in during the Syrian era. They are fighting tooth and claw for that.

Similarly, Aoun is desperate because he is seeing the deadline for the presidency approach and his chances for the post are not increasing.

Both are fighting an uphill battle against the forward motion of time.

But what can they all do? The March 8 alliance knows that within the rules of the game, i.e, the constitution, all they can ever hope to do is impede the election of a president, pending an agreement or compromise that does not seem likely, or that will come at Aoun's expense. As I might have mentioned before, that vacuum in the presidency leaves the president's authority in the cabinet's hands*. That explains one aspect of the need that the March 8 alliance sees for "breaking" the cabinet by denying it legitimacy and trying to force it to resign.

But once again, then what? March 8 until now has no constructive strategy from within the bounds of the constitution and the law.

Not to be restricted by such ridiculous things as laws and constitutions, their alternatives are simple. Early elections, transforming Lebanon's parliamentary system into a presidential one (for one time only of course)...

At this point, I give up...

March 8 must know that their demands are unreasonable and more importantly unacceptable to the "ruling majority". What matters now is that the presidential endgame is approaching. However, try as I might I can't find a logical strategy that March 8 can pursue in the endgame.

Short of spreading chaos.

Footnotes From the Lebanese Constitution:

^
- المادة 95 (المعدلة بالقانون الدستوري الصادر في 9/11/1943 وبالقانون الدستوري الصادر في 21/9/1990) على مجلس النواب المنتخب على أساس المناصفة بين المسلمين والمسيحيين اتخاذ الإجراءات الملائمة لتحقيق إلغاء الطائفية السياسية وفق خطة مرحلية وتشكيل هيئة وطنية برئاسة رئيس الجمهورية، تضم بالإضافة إلى رئيس مجلس النواب ورئيس مجلس الوزراء شخصيات سياسية وفكرية واجتماعية. مهمة الهيئة دراسة واقتراح الطرق الكفيلة بإلغاء الطائفية وتقديمها إلى مجلسي النواب والوزراء ومتابعة تنفيذ الخطة المرحلية.وفي المرحلة الانتقالية: أ- تمثل الطوائف بصورة عادلة في تشكيل الوزارة. ب- تلغى قاعدة التمثيل الطائفي ويعتمد الاختصاص والكفاءة في الوظائف العامة والقضاء والمؤسسات العسكرية والأمنية والمؤسسات العامة والمختلطة وفقاً لمقتضيات الوفاق الوطني باستثناء وظائف الفئة الأولى فيها وفي ما يعادل الفئة الأولى فيها وتكون هذه الوظائف مناصفة بين المسيحيين والمسلمين دون تخصيص أية وظيفة لأية طائفة مع التقيد بمبدأي الاختصاص والكفاءة.

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- المادة 62 (المعدلة بالقانون الدستوري الصادر في 21/9/1990)

في حال خلو سدة الرئاسة لأي علة كانت تناط صلاحيات رئيس الجمهورية وكالة بمجلس الوزراء.

In English:

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Article 95 [National Committee](1) The first Chamber or Deputies which is elected on the basis of equality between Muslims and Christians takes the appropriate measures to realize the abolition of political confessionalism according to a transitional plan. A National Committee is to be formed, headed by the President of the Republic, including, in addition to the President of the Chamber of Deputies and the Prime Minister, leading political, intellectual, and social figures.(2) The tasks of this Committee are to study and propose the means to ensure the abolition of confessionalism, propose them to the Chamber of Deputies and the Ministers, and supervise the execution of the transitional plan.(3) During the transitional phase:

a. The confessional groups are to be represented in a just and equitable fashion in the formation of the Cabinet.

b. The principle of confessional representation in public servicejobs, in the judiciary, in the military and security institutions, and in public and mixed agencies are to be cancelled in accordance with the requirements of national reconciliation; they shall be replaced by the principle of expertise and competence. However, Grade One posts and their equivalents are exempt from this rule, and the posts must be distributed equally between Christians and Muslims without reserving any particular job for any confessional group but rather applying the principles of expertise and competence

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Article 62 [Vacancy]Should the Presidency become vacant for any reason whatsoever, the Council of Ministers exercises the powers of the President by delegation.

Brace yourselves... Its gonna be a long long long ride

I have been relatively quiet throughout the events unfolding in Lebanon and the region in early 2007... mostly because there is nothing much to say in the way of analysis.

While there have been many developments, from Hezbollah's riots on a certain Tuesday that now seems so long ago, to the blow-back across universities two days later... all the way to the Ayn Aar bus bombings -shocking the country and yet shocking no one- and then the large, yet inane regurgitation plagued gathering on the anniversary of Hariri's assassination.

In the meantime, rumors of breakthroughs in "indirect" talks conducted through Iran and Saudi Arabia (woopdidoo) were circulating and proving to be vacuous. No compromises have yet materialized and I doubt any to materialize in the near future... I don't even know if I want to be wrong or not anymore - what difference does it make?

After all this is no longer primarily about Lebanon or its internal politics, March 8 succeeded at internationalizing Lebanese politics, and consequently our problems are becoming even less about Lebanon by the day. Amidst Saudi-Iranian talks and the Syro-Iranian coordination, as well as all that recent Iranian belligerency and their never-ending war games and display of divine weapons (probably imported from either russia or china and upgraded in Iran) countered by the leakage (or announcement, I forget) of American (contingency) plans to bomb the living crap out of all Iran's nuclear and military facilities... amidst all that, Lebanon's factions are becoming just cards to be played out in a much bigger regional game.

Bottom line, as Syria and Iran play for time waiting for a Godot that even they might not recognize, Lebanon simmers and starts showing signs of boiling. In the meantime the economy is tanking, state instutions are shackled and we are left at the mercy of... well I am not sure whose mercy we are at.

I am just asking myself what should we expect the near future to bring, knowing and fearing that its going to be more of the same - at best.